Peace on Earth: Christmas 1995, Volume 13 #6
Peace on Earth: Christmas 1995, Volume 13 #6
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| Over the years, indignation has very often been the reaction of Canadians who have paid attention to their government's aid and trade relations with highly oppressive regimes. And understandably so. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Canadian policies towards such regimes varied widely but not randomly. Canada was firm and vigorous towards states that were gross human rights offenders as long as they were either closely allied with the Soviet Union or else unimportant to Canadian exporters and investors. We were tough, for example, towards Equatorial Guinea, Afghanistan and Poland. | ||
| However, Canada had at best timid and minimal policies relating to the human rights records of states that, while equally repressive, were important or potentially important markets for Canadian exports or geopolitically significant and within the American orbit. El Salvador, Indonesia and Augusto Pinochet's Chile fell into this category. Far from cutting aid to such countries as a lever to influence their human rights policies, Canada tended instead to increase its aid in the hope of winning markets and foreign policy advantages. Thus, Canadian aid to Indonesia increased very significantly while Indonesian oppression in East Timor continued unabated. So also did Canadian aid to China despite the absence of any real signs of relaxation of its oppression. | ||
| By itself, however, moral indignation is inadequate as a guide when determining foreign policy. It is not reasonable to suggest that Canadian policy towards another government should be exclusively or primarily determined by that government's human rights record. Other important foreign policy objectives must also be considered. In the specific instance of Canadian foreign policy towards China, weight must be given to China's status as a major world power with a capacity to deploy nuclear weapons and as a country whose choice of development and industrialization policies have major consequences for the global environment. It should therefore be a high priority for the rest of the world to do what it can to ensure responsible Chinese policies in these and related policy areas. It is legitimate to ask whether it might not be necessary to temper international pressure on China over its human rights policies to avoid driving the Chinese leadership into a more hostile and belligerent "laager mentality." | Decision-makers in External Affairs have promoted similar policies in situations that were in fact vastly different. | |
| Of course, the main motivation for Canadian reticience to be at all outspoken on China's human rights record has almost certainly been a desire to penetrate the vast Chinese market that is now opening up to foreign trade and investment. And even this more immediate self-interested concern cannot easily be dismissed out of hand. Trade objectives are a legitimate component of Canada's foreign policy. It is politically unreasonable to urge the Canadian government to refuse to promote trade with China when this would be unlikely to influence China but would instead yield valuable trade opportunities to other industrialized countries that are less squeamish. | ||
| We may be assisted in this discussion if we recall that a great many Canadians supported the Trudeau government's efforts in the late 1960s to win international acceptance for Communist China and to extend diplomatic recognition to the regime, even though these early initiatives coincided with the intensive repression of the Cultural Revolution. Most Canadians, I suspect, also agreed with the Canadian government's extension of a $2 billion line of credit to China in 1979--the time of the suppression of the Xidan Democracy Wall movement. | ||
| Partly, no doubt, our support for opening up relations with China despite its record of gross human rights violations was eased by a myopia that sometimes clouded the judgement of the left when it contemplated repressive Communist regimes. However, both the Trudeau government and many people whom I would describe as "humane internationalists" were, I believe, primarily motivated by a conviction that international peace would be more effectively advanced by ending China's isolation than by intensifying it. We judged that lessening the threat of war was more important than registering our abhorrence of Chinese internal repression. As well, most of us thought that expanded international contacts would in time have a liberalizing impact domestically in China. Thus, both the Canadian government and humane internationalists based their decisions on their assessment of the most likely actual consequences of alternative policies. | ||
| Throughout much of the period during which Canadian policies towards China were actively debated, very similar arguments were being aired in regard to Canadian policies towards South Africa. A great many Canadians who had supported welcoming China into the international community advocated very different policies when it came to South Africa. They wanted the government to take a strongly critical position towards the South African government, openly support the African National Congress (at least with nonmilitary assistance), legislate an end to bank loans and investments in South Africa, introduce mandatory sanctions against trade with South Africa and help mobilize international support for such sanctions. | ||
| In contrast, the Canadian government in the early 1970s felt that Canada's expression of abhorrence of apartheid needed to be tempered by a recognition of the advantages of the "better than average" profits to be made by Canadian businesses in South Africa. As well, the government believed that change would be more likely if the leaders of the racist regime were not driven into a more and more defensive frame of mind by overly forceful international pressures to change. It was indeed to describe just such a situation that the expression "laager mentality" came into wide usage. | Although there were courageous democrats in China, there was no well-organized opposition movement. | |
| Canada's stance came under fire both from international opinion, particularly within the UN and the Commonwealth, and from an active set of citizen groups. In the end, Canadian policies did become stronger and more critical. Indeed, for a brief period between June 1985 and August 1986, when Prime Minister Mulroney championed the issue, Canada played a leadership role in the Commonwealth. Throughout, however, senior External Affairs officials sought to minimize Canadian measures to put pressure on the regime in South Africa. Between August 1986 and Nelson Mandela's release from prison in February 1990, the department operated on the assumption that the white regime would remain in power for a substantial number of years, drew back from any further sanctions, kept its distance from the ANC and devised policies directed primarily at moderating the views of the ruling white elite. | ||
| Thus, the position senior Canadian decision-makers took towards South Africa was consistent with their position towards China. In contrast, humane internationalists appear to have been inconsistent. Nevertheless, virtue lies with these internationalists, not with the senior decision-makers. The decision-makers were promoting similar policies in situations that were in fact vastly different. The South African government, unlike the government of China, was particularly sensitive to the threat of being cut off economically, politically and socially from the industrialized countries. International sanctions therefore made sense as a way to influence South Africa. Applied against China, sanctions would likely have increased rather than moderated internal repression and made the government less rather than more cooperative internationally. There was a further fundamental difference between China and South Africa. Although there were courageous democrats in China, there was no strong well-organized opposition movement that was demanding power and could be seen as an alternative government. In contrast, the African National Congress was solidly organized, was very widely supported in the black community, had already rendered many black townships almost ungovernable and had a military wing that was contributing to the instability that had caused a major withdrawal of foreign capital, even if it could hardly challenge the powerful South African armed forces. | ||
| The humane internationalists and the senior officials can be said to have based their positions on different analyses of the likely consequences of the policy alternatives. The hard fact is that the humane internationalists' analysis of the dynamics of change in South Africa was far more prescient than that of External Affairs. | ||
| Two basic factors explain the bureaucrats' attitude. First, the government of Canada has long been particularly concerned with advancing and protecting the immediate interests of Canadian exporters and investors in its foreign policy. This is a fact of life in Canadian politics. In area after area of foreign policy, responsiveness to the interests of the dominant class in Canada leads to a filtering out of other legitimate concerns: noneconomic long-term interests, global environmental questions and ethical obligations that are widely endorsed. It also explains the rerouting of Premier Li Peng's calvacade and the drawing of the curtain in his hotel as he left. | ||
| The second factor is a particular difficulty the Canadian government has in determining appropriate policies where oppressive regimes are being challenged by powerful popular forces. Perhaps because of its sensitivity to the interests of the dominant class, it typically fears struggle more than continuing oppression and therefore draws back from recognizing the force and legitimacy of popular movements and shaping policies that will accelerate their triumph with minimal loss of life. This process has been at work in regard not only to South Africa but also to El Salvador, East Timor and Burma. | ||
| These two factors will continue to block the emergence of a strong and adequate Canadian foreign policy towards human rights. Such a policy would be primarily concened with helping to bring to an end gross abuses of basic human rights through argument, public expression of strong official disapproval, the deployment of correcting incentives, bilateral and international pressures--certainly including economic sanctions where they are judged likely to have positive consequences--and, where they exist, public endorsement of popular opposition groups potentially able to replace an offending regime. Other legitimate foreign policy objectives would inevitably complicate decision-making, but considerations such as these would play a major role. |
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© 1996 Compass, A Jesuit Journal and Gail van Varseveld